Competencia judicial internacional en materia de infracciones de marca europea cometidas en internet – ¿es posible complicar las cosas todavía más? by Lopez-Tarruella, Aurelio
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2021), Vol. 13, Nº 2, pp. 352-361
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2021.6261
352
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION IN EU TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENTS ON THE INTERNET – IS IT POSSIBLE 
TO COMPLICATE THINGS EVEN FURTHER?*
COMPETENCIA JUDICIAL INTERNACIONAL EN MATERIA  
DE INFRACCIONES DE MARCA EUROPEA COMETIDAS 
EN INTERNET – ¿ES POSIBLE COMPLICAR LAS COSAS 
TODAVÍA MÁS?
Aurelio lopez-TArruellA
Profesor titular de Derecho internacional privado
Universidad de Alicante
Recibido: 14.07.2021/ / Aceptado: 30.07.2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2021.6261
Abstract: The volume of judgments of the CJEU in the field of EU trademarks has increased 
dramatically in the latest years. While the drafting of the grounds of jurisdiction in the EU Trademark 
Regulation is quite similar to those of the Brussels I Regulation, their interpretation varies substantially. 
This divergent interpretation affects legal certainty of companies identifying their products and services 
in the Internal market using parallel national trademarks and EU trademarks and increases the comple-
xity of litigation in those cases where both categories of industrial property rights are at stake. To reduce 
these problems, the present work proposes the adoption of a uniform interpretation of the grounds of 
jurisdiction of the EU trademark Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation.
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Resumen: El numero de sentencia del TJUE en materia de marcas europeas se ha incrementado 
dramáticamente en los últimos años. Si bien la redacción de los foros de competencia en el Reglamento 
de marca europea y del Reglamento Bruselas I es similar, su interpretación varía de manera sustancial. 
Esta divergente interpretación afecta a la seguridad jurídica de las compañías que identifican sus produc-
tos y servicios en el mercado interior haciendo uso de marcas nacionales y europeas paralelas; e incre-
menta la complejidad a la hora de litigar en aquellos casos en los que ambas categorías de derechos de 
propiedad industrial están en disputa. Para reducir estos problemas en el presente trabajo se propone la 
adopción de una interpretación uniforme de los foros de competencia del Reglamento de marca europea 
y del Reglamento Bruselas I.
Palabras clave: Competencia judicial internacional, marca europea.
Sumario: I. Introduction. II. Coincidences and divergences in the grounds of jurisdiction in the 
EUTMR and in the Brussels I Regulation. III. The CJEU lex specialis characterization of the EUTMR 
jurisdiction rules: evolution and challenges. 1. “Coty Germany”: a poorly grounded specialization and 
an inconclusive precision of the forum delicti commissi adequately revised in “AMS Neve”. 2. “Hum-
mels Holding”: specialization extends to the concept of “establishment”. IV. Final Remarks.
* The present article is an updated version of a previous work entitled “Reflexiones sobre la especialización de la inter-
pretación de los foros de competencia en los reglamentos sobre marca europea y diseño comunitario”, in AAVV, Anuario de 
Propiedad Industrial e Intelectual, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2021.
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I. Introduction
1. Nobody doubts that the creation of unitary industrial property rights is a great achievement 
of the European Union. They have become a cornerstone of the Internal market. Thanks to them, a 
company is granted protection of its trademarks, designs and, hopefully in the near future, patents in a 
market composed of 27 Member States and 500 millions of people. Making business in Europe is thus 
facilitated.
However, when it gets to enforce these rights in court, things are becoming more and more com-
plicated due to the increasing cross-border dimension of disputes. This becomes particularly apparent 
from the judgments adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) in rela-
tion to the jurisdiction or applicable law in disputes concerning Community Trademarks (now EU Tra-
demarks) or Community Designs. From 1996 to 2013, the CJEU adopted just two decisions1. From 2014 
to present, nine decisions2. In this latter period, the decisions concerning national IP rights were five3.
2. Regulation 2017/1001 on the EU Trademark (hereinafter EUTMR) include special rules on 
jurisdiction and on applicable law4. As explained in section II, rules referred to the first issue differ with 
those established in Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I Regulation) for disputes concerning national IP 
rights5, in particular in cases where the defendant is domiciled in a third State. However, the drafting and 
concepts used in those grounds of jurisdiction are similar to those used in the Brussels I Regulation. This 
should be welcome because cross-border disputes in relation to a unitary industrial property right also 
usually involve a “parallel” national IP right (i. e. a national right in one or several Member States gran-
ted to the same distinctive sign that is registered as a EUTM) and actions for unfair competition. Prima 
facie, the use of the same grounds of jurisdiction ensure that these interrelated complaints can be filed 
before the courts of the same Member State. Unfortunately, this is not the case because, as addressed in 
Section III, the CJEU’s interpretation of the concepts used in the grounds of jurisdiction of the EUTMR 
(and the CDR) differs from the interpretation adopted for the same concepts in the framework of the 
Brussels I Regulation. The CJUE justifies this divergent interpretation in the lex specialis character of 
the rules of jurisdiction in the EUTMR. It is my understanding that the need to autonomously interpret 
these rules is not sufficiently grounded and that it complicates the cross-border enforcement of IP rights 
in Europe.
II. Coincidences and divergences in the grounds of jurisdiction in the EUTMR and in the Brussels 
I Regulation
3. Art. 123 EUTMR establishes the obligation for the Member States to designate within their 
respective judicial systems a limited number of courts (the EUTM Courts) with exclusive competence to 
1 CJEU Judgments of 14 December 2006, C-316/05, “Nokia” (ECLI:EU:C:2006:789) and of 12 April 2011, C-235/09, 
“DHL Express” (ECLI:EU:C:2011:238). 
2 CJEU Judgments of 5 June 2014, C-360/12, “Coty Germany” (ECLI:EU:C:2014:1318); 18 May 2017, C-617/15, “Hum-
mel Holding” (ECLI:EU:C:2017:390); 13 July 2017, C-433/16, “Bayerische Motoren Werke” (ECLI:EU:C:2017:550); 22 Sep-
tember 2016, C-223/15, “combit Software” (ECLI:EU:C:2016:719); 27 September 2017, Joined Cases C-24/16 and C-25/16, 
“Nintendo” (ECLI:EU:C:2017:724); 19 October 2017, C-231/16, “Merck”; 19 de October 2017, C 425/16, “Raimund” 
(ECLI:EU:C:2017:771); 5 September 2019, C-172/18, “AMS Neve” (ECLI:EU:C:2019:674); 21 November 2019, C-678/18, 
“Procureur-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden” (ECLI:EU:C:2019:998).
3 CJEU Judgements of 14 July 2016, C-230/15, “Brite Strike Technologies” (ECLI:EU:C:2016:560), 5 October 2017, “Hans-
sen Beleggingen BV” (ECLI:EU:C:2017:738); 3 April 2014, C-387/12, “Hi Hotel” (ECLI:EU:C:2014:215); 22 January 2015, 
C-441/13, “Hedjuk” (ECLI:EU:C:2015:28); 22 April 2016, C-572/14, “Austro-Mechana” (ECLI:EU:C:2016:286). 
4 This is also the case for the Regulation 6/2002 on the Community Design (hereinafter CDR). Since the wording of the 
provisions in each Regulation is similar, the conclusions of this commentary in relation to the EUTMR apply mutatis mutandi 
to the CDR. 
5 See T. B. lArson, Intellectual Property Jurisdiction Strategies (Where to Litigate Unitary Rigths vs. National Rights in 
the EU), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017.
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hear the categories of actions listed in Art. 124 EUTMR6. The international jurisdiction of these courts 
to hear about those actions is established in Art. 1257.
According to this provision, in the absence of a choice of forum agreement (something that in 
these categories of disputes is generally the case) and of tacit submission (meaning, the defendant ap-
pears before the court but does not challenge its jurisdiction), the EUTM court will declare jurisdiction:
a)  if the defendant is domiciled in that Member State;
b)   in the absence of domicile in the EU, if the defendant has an establishment in that Member State;
c)  in the absence of the above, if the plaintiff is domiciled in that Member State;
d)  in the absence of the above, if the plaintiff has an establishment in that Member State;
e)   in the absence of the above, if the complaint if filed before the EUTM courts of the Member 
State where the Office (EUIPO) has its seat (i. e. Alicante, Spain) 8. 
In any of these situations, with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement 
of a EUTM, Art. 125 (5) allows the plaintiff to alternatively file the complaint before the EUTM Courts 
“of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which 
an act referred to in Article 11(2) has been committed”. This is the classic ground of jurisdiction known 
as forum delicti commissi. However, while the courts designated in the previous grounds can hear of an 
infringement committed in any State, the competence of the court based on the application of this latter 
ground of jurisdiction is limited to infringements within the territory of the Member State where the 
complaint is filed (Art. 126). 
Additionally, Art. 131 EUTMR allows a plaintiff to ask for provisional measures before the 
court that is hearing of the main complaint or, as an alternative, before the court of any other Member 
State in which the measure is to be enforced9.
4. The comparison between these grounds on jurisdiction with those applicable to disputes on 
national IP Rights allows the identification of certain parallelisms. To start with, when the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State, the complaint can be brought before the courts of that State (Art. 4 Brussels 
I Regulation, Art. 125 (1) EUTMR), or before the courts of the forum delicti commissi (Art. 7 (2) Brussels 
I Regulation, Art. 125 (5) EUTMR). The CJEU has interpreted that, similar to what Art. 125 (5) says, the 
courts of forum delicti commissi can only hear about complaints concerning IP right infringements com-
mitted in the territory of that Member State10. In relation with provisional measures, the Brussels I Regu-
lation (Art. 35) establishes a double-option system similar to the one provided for in Art. 131 EUTMR.
5. This comparison allows the identification of certain differences as well. These divergences 
derive from the particularities that surround unitary titles11 and the clear intention of the EU legislator to 
strengthen the protection of EUTM12. 
6 For actions not listed in this provision, the Brussels I Regulation remains fully applicable. 
7 See C. Heinze, “Unitary Intellectual Property Rights and Jurisdiction”, in J. BAsedow, G. rüHl, F. FerrAri And p. de Mi-
Guel Asensio (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law, vol. 2, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017, p. 1792.
8 An example of the application of this ground of jurisdiction can be found in the Judgement of the Appelate Court of 
Alicante 1089/2014 of 1 July 2014 (ECLI: ES:APA:2014:1089). The action for infringement of two EUTM (“BREEZES” and 
“Superclubs Breezes”) was filed by VRL International LTD, with domiciled in Cayman Islands, against Nova Hotels LTD, a 
legal entity from Tanzania that runs a hotel in the city of Bewjuu, Zanzibar, under the name of BREEZES.
9 In this regard, it should be recalled the CJUE Judgement of 21 November 2019, C-678/18, “Procureur-Generaal bij de 
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden”. The Court states “that the courts and tribunals of the Member States with jurisdiction to order 
provisional measures, including protective measures, in respect of a national design also have jurisdiction to order such mea-
sures in respect of a Community design”.
10 CJEU Judgement of 19 April 2012, C-523/10, “Wintersteiger”
11 See CJEU Judgment of 5 June 2014, C-360/12, “Coty Germany”, par. 36: “the origin and the context of Regulation No 
40/94 confirm the intention of the EU legislature to derogate from the rule on jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of Regula-
tion No 44/2001 in the light, in particular, of the inability of the rule on jurisdiction to respond to the specific problems relating 
to the infringement of a Community trade mark”.
12 This is confirmed in CJEU of 18 May 2017, C-617/15, “Hummel Holding”, pars. 27 y 28.
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First of all, in relation with a EUTM, it is not possible to bring non-infringement declaratory 
actions before the courts of the forum delicti commissi. This is expressly banned in Art. 126 (2) with 
the purpose of avoiding or at least reducing so-called torpedo actions13. On the contrary, for national 
IP rights, CJEU Judgment of 25 October 2012, C-133/11, “Folien Fischer” states that “an action for a 
negative declaration seeking to establish the absence of liability in tort, delict, or quasi-delict falls within 
the scope of [present Art. 7 (2) Brussels I Regulation]”.
More importantly, in the case of the EUTMR, the EUTM Courts can only declare jurisdiction on 
the basis of the rules provided for in the Regulation. They cannot refer to their national rules of jurisdic-
tion in any case. On the contrary, for disputes concerning national IP rights, in the absence of tacit or ex-
press submission, when the defendant is domiciled in a third State, the Brussels I Regulation establishes 
that the court where the complaint is brought shall declare jurisdiction on the basis of its national rules 
of jurisdiction (Art. 6). These rules may vary from one Member State to the other. As a consequence, 
litigants in national IP rights are subjected to a higher degree of legal uncertainty in relation to jurisdic-
tion. This obliges them to incur in higher costs when designing their litigation strategy to determine in 
which Member States they can bring the lawsuit14. 
Another important advantage of the EUTMR rules on jurisdiction is that, when the alleged 
infringer is domiciled in a third state, the trademark holder can initiate a pan-European infringement 
action (i. e. an action in relation to the infringement committed anywhere in the territory of the EU) 
before the Courts of its domicile or establishment – art. 125 (2); or, if it does not have a domicile or esta-
blishment in the EU, before the EUTM Courts in Alicante – art. 125 (3). In the case of national IP rights, 
the jurisdiction to hear pan-European actions is only granted to the courts of the Member State or the 
defendant’s domicile – art. 4 Brussels I Regulation15. When the defendant is domiciled in a third State 
such possibility depends on each Member State’s rules on jurisdiction, but this is highly unlikely due to 
the lack of a reasonable connection between the court and the facts of the dispute that took place abroad. 
6. Besides these advantages, it is worth to mention that some of the grounds of jurisdiction esta-
blished in Art. 125 EUTMR may be problematic due to their possible exorbitant character. In particular, 
this might be the case when the complaint is filed before the courts of the Member State where (1) the 
plaintiff is domiciled, or where (2) the plaintiff has an establishment, or where (3) the Office has its seat 
and the infringement did not occur in any of those places. The judgments adopted by these courts may 
find obstacles for their recognition and enforcement in third states where the defendant is domiciled or 
where he has assets. This is due to the fact that national systems of recognition and enforcement of fo-
reign judgments contain a ground for denial based on the exorbitant character of the head of jurisdiction 
that the court of origin applied to declare jurisdiction.
This might be particularly problematic in the relations with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. 
These countries are party to the Lugano Convention 2007 (hereinafter LC) alongside the EU. When the 
defendant is domiciled in any of these States, special rules of jurisdiction in the EUTMR are not appli-
13 In the context of disputes related to a cross-border infringement of IP rights, a torpedo action consists on the alleged 
infringer taking on ahead of the right holder and filing an action for declaration of non-infringement before the courts of the 
Member State that is the most convenient for his interests. From that moment, if the right holder wants to file an action for 
infringement of the same IP right, he will need to do so before the same court. Due to the lis pendens rule in Art. 29 R. Brussels 
I Regulation, if he files the action before the court of any other Member State, such court shall stay the proceedings until the 
court first seize determine jurisdiction. In certain Member States, this determination may take a long time. See M. FrAnzosi, 
“Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo”, EIPR, 1997, pp. 382 – 385. 
14 It is generally the case that those rules establish the forum delicti commissi – the courts of a Member State have juris-
diction if the infringement has been committed in the territory of that State. See, for instance, Art. 22 quinquies b) of the Or-
ganic Law 6/1985 of the Judicial Power in Spain. Nevertheless, national systems may establish other grounds of jurisdiction, 
in certain cases of an exorbitant character – i. e. grounds that show little connection between the dispute and the court with 
jurisdiction. 
15 CJUE of 19 April 2012, C-523/09, “Wintersteiger”; 22 January 2015, C-441/13, “Hedjuk”; 3 October 2013, C-170/12, 
“Pinckney”; of 21 December 2016, C-618/15, “Concurrence”. While these judgments can be interpreted as granting pan-Euro-
pean jurisdiction to the courts of the “place where the act giving rise to the alleged infringement occurred or may occur”, such 
place will generally coincide with the location of the defendant’s domicile or place of establishment. 
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cable. According to Art. 64 (2) LC, international jurisdiction is governed by the Convention. It shall be 
interpreted that the reference in this provision to the Brussels I Regulation extents to the EUTMR on 
the basis of the general referral to the Brussels I Regulation in Art. 122 EUTMR. In a situation where a 
EUTM Court of a Member State disregards this provision, its decision might not be enforceable in any of 
the non-EU parties of the LC (Norway, Iceland or Switzerland). The reason is that according to Art. 64 (3) 
LC the courts of these States can deny exequatur of a judgment adopted by the courts of a Member State 
“if the ground of jurisdiction on which the judgment has been based differs from that resulting from [the 
Lugano] Convention and recognition or enforcement is sought against a party who is domiciled in a State 
where this Convention but not an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article applies, unless the 
judgment may otherwise be recognised or enforced under any rule of law in the State addressed”. 
This is not a mere theoretical problem. Judgment 87/19 of the EUTM Court of Alicante (Spain) 
is referred to an action for infringement filed by the US firm Lyft against a Norwegian company in rela-
tion to the use of the term “Letlift” in a mobile application that could be downloaded in several Member 
States. The Alicante Court based its jurisdiction in art. 125 (3) – i. e. the place where the Office has its 
seat, thus a ground different from those established in the LC. If the defendant would not voluntarily 
comply with the judgment, the plaintiff might find problems to enforce the judgement in Norway due 
to art. 64 (3) LC. These problems would not appear to recognize the part of the judgement related to the 
infringement committed in Spain. This is so because for this part of the judgement the Alicante Court 
based its jurisdiction on the forum delicti commissi in Art. 125 (5), a ground of jurisdiction that LC es-
tablishes in Art. 5 (3).
III. The CJEU Lex Specialis characterization of the EUTMR jurisdiction rules: evolution and 
challenges 
7. As previously mentioned, from 2014 to present, the CJEU has adopted nine decisions about 
the Private International Law (PIL) aspects of EUTM and CD. Some of these judgments provide an 
interpretation of the rules of jurisdiction in the regulations that is aligned with the one given to the rules 
in the Brussels I Regulation for disputes concerning national IP rights. This is the case of “Nintendo”, 
concerning the ground for complaints against multiple defendants – Art. 8 (1) Brussels I Regulation, or 
“Merck” in relation to the rules governing situations of lis pendens. The use of the same criteria followed 
in the framework of the Brussels I Regulation for the interpretation of the provisions in the EUTMR 
and CDR guarantees the coherence of the system of IPR litigation in Europe, thus facilitating the cross-
border civil enforcement of IP rights. 
Despite this advantage, in other decisions, a specialization in the interpretation of the rules of 
jurisdiction in the EUTMR (and CDR) is sustained. To my understanding the characterization of these 
rules as lex specialis is not sufficiently grounded, and it entails incoherence in the litigation system, 
creating obstacles to the cross-border enforcement of IP rights. This is the case of “Coty Germany”, 
adequately revised in “AMS Neve”, and “Hummels Holding”.
1. “Coty Germany”: a poorly grounded specialization and an inconclusive precision of the forum 
delicti commissi adequately revised in “AMS Neve”
8. The relevance of “Coty Germany” lies in two aspects. On the one hand, it is the first decision 
where the CJEU states that the grounds of jurisdiction of the EUTMR are lex specialis in relation to the 
rules of the Brussels I Regulation. On the other, it develops how to apply the forum delicti commissi in 
cases where the infringing activities are located in multiple states. Both aspects are subject to criticism. 
9. The lex specialis character of the rules of jurisdiction of the EUTMR is grounded on a literal 
interpretation of Art. 122 EUTMR. According to the first paragraph of this provision, international juris-
diction in EUTM disputes is governed by the Brussels I Regulation. However paragraph (2) expressly 
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excludes the application of certain provisions of that Regulation, including Art. 7 (2) which states the 
forum delicti commissi. Therefore, the CJEU states that the rules of jurisdiction of the EUTMR do not 
need to follow the same interpretation than those of the Brussels I Regulation16. Additionally, the Court 
refers to the genesis of the EUTMR and the inability of the rule on jurisdiction in present Art. 7 (2) Brus-
sels I Regulation to respond to the specific problems relating to the infringement of a EUTM17. However, 
in my opinion, the Court does not sufficiently explain which are those specific problems or the reasons 
why such genesis necessarily leads to a special interpretation of its rules on jurisdiction. Having in mind 
the consequences of establishing a lex specialis character, the grounds provided by the Court to sustain 
this interpretation are very poor, although the Court had the chance to complement them some years later 
in “Hummels Holding”. 
10. In relation to the second aspect, the lex specialis character of the rules of jurisdiction of the 
EUTMR is in itself the argument provided by the Court to sustain an interpretation of the forum delicti 
commissi in Art. 125 (5) that departs from the interpretation granted to the same ground of jurisdiction 
in Art. 7 (2) Brussels I Regulation. According to the Court, when the infringing activity and the damages 
of such activity occur in different Member States, “the concept of ‘the Member State in which the act of 
infringement has been committed’ implies […] that that linking factor relates to active conduct on the part 
of the person causing that infringement. Therefore, the linking factor provided for by that provision refers 
to the Member State where the act giving rise to the alleged infringement occurred or may occur, not the 
Member State where that infringement produces its effects”18. The ruling is problematic for two reasons. 
As abovementioned, the CJEU departs from its very own interpretation regarding infringements 
of national IP rights. For these categories of rights, the Court understands that in cases where the in-
fringing activity and the damages occur in multiple Member States, the courts of any of these Member 
States can declare jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 7 (2), even if the complaint aims to determine the 
liability of a person that did not directly intervene in the infringement19. This flexible interpretation of 
forum delicti commissi is confirmed in other judgments where the Court states that the mere accessibi-
lity of a website from the territory of a Member State is enough for the courts of that State to declare 
jurisdiction20. The existence of a different interpretation of grounds of jurisdiction with similar wordings 
does not facilitate the work of international litigators. 
Additionally, the judgement reduces the effet utile of forum delicti commissi in Art. 125 (5) 
EUTMR. This is particularly so in infringements committed on the Internet. In these cases, the place of 
the act giving rise to the alleged infringement is located where the infringing information is uploaded 
on the Internet21. Most of the times, such place coincides with the defendant’s domicile or establishment 
thus forum delicti commissi becomes futile22. 
 
11. Fortunately, the CJEU had the chance to revise and precise this interpretation in “AMS Neve”. 
In this case, a company domiciled in Spain was offering in its website products to consumers in the Uni-
ted Kingdom that infringed the EUTM and UK trademark of a British company. According to the CJEU 
case law, English courts have jurisdiction to hear the complaint about the UK trademark – Art. 7 (2) Brus-
sels I Regulation but, having in mind the interpretation in “Coty Germany”, the court was hesitant about 
the jurisdiction in relation with the EUTM. Despite its previous decision, the Court states that, for the 
16 Paragraphs. 27-28.
17 Par. 36.
18 Par. 34.
19 CJEU Judgement of 3 April 2014, C-387/12, “Hi Hotel”.
20 CJEU Judgements of 22 January 2015, C-441/13, “Hedjuk”; of 3 October 2013, C-170/12, “Pinckney”; of 21 December 
2016, C-618/15, “Concurrence”.
21 CJEU Judgement 27 September 2017, “Nintendo”, par. 108: “it must be held that the event giving rise to the damage is 
the conduct by which an operator offers for sale allegedly infringing goods, inter alia by placing an offer for sale on its website. 
Accordingly, the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred within the meaning of Article 8(2) of Regulation 
864/2007 is the place where the process of putting the offer for sale online by that operator on its website was activated”.
22 See A. Kur, “Abolising Infringement Jurisdiction for EU Marks? – The Perfume Marks Decision by the General Federal 
Court of Justice”, IIC, vol 49, 2018, pp. 452-465, esp. 455.
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purpose of present Art. 125 (5), an infringement EUTM is committed in the place “of the Member State 
within which the consumers or traders to whom that advertising and those offers for sale are directed are 
located”. The decision looks like a 180-degree turn of the “Coty Germany” case law. However, the diffe-
rent interpretation is sustained in the differences that exist between the factual situations of both cases. 
In “Coty Germany”, the infringing products had not been introduced or offered by the defendant in the 
Member State where the complaint was filed. Such introduction was due to resales by a third party. On the 
contrary, in “AMS Neve”, the defendant was offering the infringing products in the Member State where 
the complaint was filed. Both decisions thus are not in contradiction although a clarification was needed23.
12. The decision should be highly welcomed for reactivating the effet utile of forum delicti com-
missi. Thanks to the ruling, EUTM owners may sue before the courts “of the Member State within which 
the consumers or traders to whom that advertising and those offers for sale are directed are located, not-
withstanding that that third party took decisions and steps in another Member State to bring about that 
electronic display”. This is highly convenient for EUTM owners because this place will usually coincide 
with the place where he is domiciled and where he carries out its main commercial activities.
However, to my understanding, the judgment is not entirely satisfactory. Depending on the 
category of rights under dispute, the divergences on the interpretation of the forum delicti commission 
still remain. For disputes concerning EUTM, the decision introduces the so-called “targeting activities” 
criterion: for the EUTM Court of a Member State to declare jurisdiction, it needs to be shown that the 
defendant targets its commercial activities to that Member State’s market. For disputes concerning na-
tional IP rights or claims of unfair competition, this criterion is not applicable. On the contrary, there is 
a consolidated case law of the CJEU favoring the application of the “mere accessibility” criterion: the 
simple fact that the web site of the alleged infringer can be accessed or an app can be downloaded from 
a Member State where the IP right is protected or where the activity can be considered unfair is sufficient 
to trigger the jurisdiction of the Courts of that Member State in accordance with forum delicti commissi 
in Art. 7 (2) Brussels I Regulation24. Therefore, the complexity deriving from the different interpretation 
of the ground of jurisdiction does not completely disappear. 
This complexity increases in those cases where the EUTM owner has a parallel national trade-
mark – i. e. a national trademark covering the same distinctive sign that is protected as a EUTM, and he 
decides to sue for infringement of both trademarks in the same complaint. Additionally, the trademark 
owner may add to the complaint a claim based on unfair competition. If so, situations may still appear 
where the courts of the forum delicti commissi can declare jurisdiction to hear the part of the complaint 
referred to the infringement of the national trademark and of unfair competition, but not the one concer-
ning the EUTM. 
The solution to this complexity should not come from an amendment of the CJUE case law in 
“AMS Neve”, but from a reform of the case law concerning jurisdiction on actions of infringement of natio-
nal IP rights and of unfair competition. This is so, because the “mere accessibility” criterion is a source of 
legal uncertainty to any company carrying out commercial activities on the Internet. These companies can-
not foresee where they can be sued in case they voluntarily or involuntarily infringe a trademark. Forum 
delicti commissi in Art. 7 (2) Brussels I Regulation should only give jurisdiction to the courts of the Mem-
ber State where a company is targeting its commercial activities. As abovementioned, this not the case at 
present. To my understanding this creates a high degree a legal uncertainty on companies making business 
in the Internet. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the “targeting activities” criterion is respectful of the 
due process right since the defendant would not be forced to defend himself before the courts of a Member 
State that lacks connection with the case and that may imply important economic costs. 
23 In fact, in the “Parfummarken” case, the General Federal Court of Justice (BGH) applied the interpretation in “Coty Ger-
many” to deny the jurisdiction of the German Courts in a case concerning a trademark infringement committed in the Internet: 
“The defendants’ online presence in German does not justify the assumption that the act of infringement within the meaning 
of Art. 97(5) CTMR was committed in Germany (par. 30).  Decision of 9 November 2017, case No I ZR 164/16, IIC, vol. 49, 
2018, pp. 485-493.
24 CJUE of 19 April 2012, C-523/09, “Wintersteiger”; 22 January 2015, C-441/13, “Hedjuk”; 3 October 2013, C-170/12, 
“Pinckney”; of 21 December 2016, C-618/15, “Concurrence”
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13. There is one last factor that increases the complexity of the IPR cross-border litigation sys-
tem in the EU. It refers to the interaction between the “AMS Neve” and the “Nintendo” judgements25. 
The latter decision concerns the interpretation of art. 8 (2) Rome II Regulation26 in relation to the law 
applicable to the aspects of an infringement of community designs which are not regulated in the CDR. 
According to the Court, the concept of “country in which the act of infringement was committed […] 
refers to the country where the event giving rise to the damage occurred”27. In a case where a person 
offers for sale allegedly infringing goods by placing an offer for sale on its website, such place is located 
“where the process of putting the offer for sale online by that operator on its website was activated”28. 
As a consequence, while “AMS Neve” allows the courts of the place where the online offers for sale are 
directed to hear an action for EUTM infringement, such courts would need to apply a foreign law to the 
aspects of the complaint not directly regulated by the EUTMR29 – i. e. the law of the State where the in-
formation was uploaded to the website30. Such aspects include, for instance, the remedies and measures 
available to the trademark owner in case of infringement. 
2. “Hummels Holding”: specialization extends to the concept of “establishment”.
14. The second judgment where the lex specialis character of the EUTMR grounds of juris-
diction is asserted is “Hummels Holding”. In this decision, besides the reinforcement of the arguments 
in favor of the specialization, the Court adopts a concept of “establishment” that departs from the one 
sustained in the framework of Brussels I Regulation and opens the door to forum shopping practices. 
15. In relation to the lex specialis character, the judgement refers to the different objectives of 
the rules of jurisdiction in the EUTMR and of the rules in the Brussels I Regulation. While the formers 
are aimed at guaranteeing a proper administration of justice and, in certain cases, the protection of the 
weaker party of the relationship, the main objective of the latter is to reinforce the protection of the 
EUTM, to reduce the risk of incompatible judgments and to avoid the harm to the unitary character of 
the title31. In my opinion, these arguments can be criticized. Despite the fact that certain exceptions are 
provided, Art. 122 (1) clearly states that jurisdiction concerning EUTM is governed by the Brussels 
I Regulation. One of the main principles that inform such Regulation is the defendant’s due process 
right32. Therefore, when interpreting the rules of jurisdiction of the EUTMR, this principle should at 
least have the same weight that the objectives identified by the CJEU. Unfortunately, as “Hummels Hol-
ding” shows, this is not the case.
16. In relation with the second aspect, the factual situation in the origin of the judgment needs 
to be reminded: an action for infringement filed by Danish company Hummels against Nike US before 
the courts of Germany, a Member State where the latter has a second-tier subsidiary, Nike Deutschland 
25 P. de MiGuel Asensio, Conflict of Laws and the Internet, Cheltenham-Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2020., par. 5.105.
26 Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to extracontractual obligations.
27 The judgement precises that “where the same defendant is accused of various acts of infringement in various Member 
States, the correct approach for identifying the event giving rise to the damage is not to refer to each alleged act of infringement, 
but to make an overall assessment of that defendant’s conduct in order to determine the place where the initial act of infringe-
ment at the origin of that conduct was committed or threatened by it”.
28 Par. 108.
29 It should be recalled that in several Member States, the content of a foreign law is not accredited by the court on its own 
motion, but it must be proved by the interested party. 
30 In those cases where the complaint also includes claims in relation to the infringement of national trademarks or acts of 
unfair competition, the application of that law should be combined with the law of the country where protection is claimed – art. 
8 (1), and the law of the affected market – art. 6 (2) Rome II Regulation. In both cases, such laws will coincide with that of the 
courts of the forum delicti commissi.
31 CJEU of 18 May 2017, C-617/15, “Hummel Holding”, pars. 27 y 28.
32 CJEU Judgements of 13 July 2016, C-4/03, “GAT” (ECLI:EU:C:2006:457), par. 28; and C-539/03, “Roche Nederland-
en” (ECLI:EU:C:2006:458), par. 37.
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GmbH33. The CJEU was asked whether this subsidiary could be considered an “establishment” of the de-
fendant for the purpose of Art. 125 (1) so that the courts of Germany could declare jurisdiction in relation 
to the commercialization of the infringing products in several Member States. In this respect, it should be 
recalled that Art. 7 (5) Brussels I Regulation uses the concept of “establishment” as synonym to “branches 
or agencies”, i. e. entities without its own legal personality34. On the contrary, while they may act under 
the instructions of a parent company, subsidiaries are considered autonomous legal entities that are liable 
for their own acts. In this regard, a reference should be made to a classic judgement in this field, “Roche 
Nederlanden”: in this case, the plaintiff was forced to sue each of the subsidiaries that committed the alle-
ged infringement in their respective Member States of domicile. The plaintiffs were not allowed to file the 
complaint before the courts of The Netherlands, where the parent company had its seat35. 
With these precedents in mind, one might have felt inclined to bet that the CJUE would unders-
tand that Nike Deutschland GmbH could not be considered an “establishment” for the purpose of Art. 
125 (1) and that the German court should decline jurisdiction in favor of the courts of the Member State 
where the plaintiff was domiciled, i. e. Denmark – Art. 125 (2). However, the Court adopted a comple-
tely different interpretation. According to its decision, whether the entity has legal personality or not is 
not relevant36. “[A] legally distinct second-tier subsidiary, with its seat in a Member State, of a parent 
body that has no seat in the European Union is an ‘establishment’, within the meaning of that provision, 
of that parent body if the subsidiary is a center of operations which, in the Member State where it is 
located, has a certain real and stable presence from which commercial activity is pursued, and has the 
appearance of permanency to the outside world, such as an extension of the parent body”.
17. As previously mentioned, in my opinion there are at least two reasons to criticize the deci-
sion. On the one side, it affects the coherence of the system and increases the complexity to the cross-
border enforcement of IP right. Litigants should be aware that the concept of “establishment” has a 
different meaning in disputes concerning IP rights where Art. 7 (5) Brussels I Regulation applies, than 
in disputes concerning EUTM, where Art. 125 (1) applies. It should be assumed that the meaning in the 
EUTMR would also apply to disputes concerning CD. 
On the other side, the decision widely opens the door to forum shopping. To start with, the Court 
states that the defendant may have establishments in different Member States and that the courts of 
any of these States can declare jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 125 (1). But even more, the Court states 
that the establishment of the defendant is part of the general ground of jurisdiction in the EUTMR, i. e. 
defendant’s domicile, thus the decision favors an extensive interpretation of the concept. It also esta-
blishes that, contrary to the interpretation provided in the framework of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
participation of the establishment in the infringing acts that give raise to the dispute is not necessary37. 
Finally, this interpretation may also be used to practice forum shopping on the application of Art. 125 
(2) EUTMR that grants jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State of the plaintiff’s establishment. 
To sum up, the interpretation of “establishment” provided by the CJEU may offer an extremely high 
number of alternatives to litigants to practice forum shopping. This is incompatible with the need to 
guarantee the predictability of the grounds of jurisdiction and with the defendant’s due process right.
33 It is a second-tier subsidiary because it belongs to Nike Retail, a Dutch company that, at the same time, is a subsidiary 
of Nike US. 
34 According to the CJEU case law, four conditions need to be met for the application of this ground of jurisdiction: a) the 
establishment is a place of business which has the appearance of permanency in the Member State where it is located; b) it is 
an entity capable of being interlocutor for third parties following the instructions of the parent company; c) the establishment 
acts on behalf of the parent company; d) the acts giving rise to the disputes must have been committed by the establishment. 
(CJEU Judgments of 22 November de 1978, 33/78, “Somafer c. Saar-Ferngas” (ECLI:EU:C:1978:205), of 18 March 1981, 
139/80, “Blanckaert & Willems c. Trost” (ECLI:EU:C:1981:70), 6 April 1995, C- 439/93, “Lloyd’s c. Campenon Bernard” 
(ECLI:EU:C:1995:104)
35 CJEU Judgment 13 July 2006, C-539/03, “Roche Nederlanden c. Primus”
36 Par. 38
37 Par. 40.
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IV. Final remarks
18. The establishment of special rules on jurisdiction in the EUTMR and the CDR is justified 
on the particularities that surround unitary IP rights. However, contrary to the opinion of CJEU, I do not 
think these particularities justify the lex specialis character of these rules. Or, at least, the judgments co-
vered in this short commentary do not adequately reflect the need to adopt an interpretation that departs 
from the one provided to the same concepts in Brussels I Regulation. 
A direct consequence of this divergent interpretation is the complexity it introduces when liti-
gating in Europe: a concept may have a different meaning depending on whether the litigation refers to 
national IP rights – the interpretation for the Brussels I Regulation applies, or to unitary IP rights – the 
interpretation for the EUTMR or CDR applies. This complexity increases when, as it is usually the case, 
a single dispute concerns unitary rights, national IP rights and acts of unfair competition.  
An indirect consequence is the legal uncertainty that it creates to companies making business in 
the Internal Market regarding the places where they can be sued in case of IP infringement. In particular, 
the judgement in “Hummels Holding” favors the practice of forum shopping due to the extremely wide 
interpretation it provides of the concept of “establishment” for the purpose of the EUTMR. 
But not everything should be criticized. The “AMS Neve” judgment introduces an interpretation 
of forum delicti commissi that guarantees an adequate balance between the effective enforcement of 
IPR and the defendant’s right to a due process. Hopefully the CJEU would expand this interpretation to 
disputes concerning national IP right and unfair competition as a first step to recover the coherence of 
the cross-border litigation system in Europe.
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